Where will Kadima Go?
With unpopular Israeli Prime Minister Olmert again under investigation and the Kadima primary scheduled for the fall is it possible that his centrist Kadima party will survive the next Israeli election? The answer is a tentative yes – if savvy Kadima politicians can leverage the favorable political environment, expand their party’s infrastructure and contain Olmert’s unpopularity.
Kadima’s first strength is the discrediting of Israel’s political ideologies: The left could not bring peace; the right could not bring security. And yet, as compared to 10 years ago, Israelis are more willing to compromise on the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, Israelis overwhelmingly support separation from the Palestinians, continued Israeli military activity in the West Bank and Gaza and are as unhopeful as ever as to the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace.
Kadima provides the centrist response: It is willing to negotiate core issues with the Palestinians and with the Syrians but is reluctant to trust them with Israel’s security. It expands settlements near the 1967 border and holds back on construction elsewhere. And Kadima politicians understand the need to make painful concessions in order to create a Palestinian state.
The unpopularity of the leaders of the liberal Labor party and the conservative Likud further strengthens Kadima. Labor chairman Barak is renowned for the failures and excesses of the 1990s peace process. Likud chairman Netanyahu is not fondly remembered for his concessions to the Palestinians and for his neo-liberal economic policies. And both suffered major corruption scandals.
Kadima’s second strength is the popularity of its politicians – except for Olmert. On that score, the public sees Foreign Minster and Deputy Prime Minister Tzipi Livni – a veteran of Israel’s intelligence apparatus – as competent and cool-headed. Livni, the front-runner to succeed Olmert as Kadima party chair, is popular though she is less than charismatic. And current Transportation Minster and Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz’s impressive resume includes serving as IDF Chief of Staff and Defense Minister making him a formidable contender.
Kadima’s centrist approach has managed to achieve a fragile sense of security. Yet the Second Lebanon War and the rocket fire from Gaza undermine this achievement. And Olmert’s latest corruption investigation only decreases his popularity.
Further, while Kadima is contending for the status as Israel’s majority party, its recent formation leads it to face enormous challenges retaining loyal supporters. And Olmert’s overwhelming unpopularity following the 2006 Lebanon war has made this a Herculean task.
As such, Kadima could follow the path of the first attempt to form a centrist party: the aptly-named Center party of the 1990s. While briefly popular, the party could not mediate the intensely polarized Israeli political atmosphere of the 1990s.
Certainly Kadima has already lost some of its initial luster. And if previous trends hold, Kadima will collapse in the next election. But most of the public’s ire is directed toward Olmert, not Kadima. And Kadima has a popular and pragmatic approach to Israel’s problems.
Kadima could thus follow an alternate path that would allow it to survive. To this end, Kadima would have to draw on its three major strengths: the public’s continuing disillusionment with the right and the left, the depth of its political bench and the unpopularity of likely opposition figures. Meanwhile, it would have to fight its image as corrupt and inept.
To do this, ambitious politicians like Livni and Mofaz could continue to use Olmert as a piñata to deflect public displeasure. They would also need to maintain their distance from him – or dump him if he begins to erode support for Kadima. Finally, they will need to enhance efforts to build a grassroots party infrastructure. And, if they succeed, Kadima might just become the majority, centrist party Israel has never had.