Medstream Part II

July 28th, 2008 by Daniel Kushner

A feasibility study looking into the potential for a cluster of pipelines bringing oil, natural gas and other resources from Turkey to Israel, and possibly India, will take ten months.The pipelines would begin to be constructed sometime in 2009, and is expected to cost nearly 8 billion dollars. The Turks and Israelis are hoping that the French-led Union for the Mediterranean might help fund the project.

The proposed pipeline would allow the oil that normally takes more than a month to go from Russia to India, to arrive in only 19 days. It is expected to transport up to 40 million tonnes of oil, or more than 270 million barrels, annually. In 2007, Israel consumed oil at the rate of 80 million barrels annually, the vast majority of which came from Russia. The rest of the oil is expected to be exported to India and possibly East Asia.

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MedStream

July 28th, 2008 by Daniel Kushner

A series of countries, including Turkey, Israel and India are discussing a new pipeline that could play a decisive role in the energy politics of the region. The proposed “Medstream” project would be a cluster of five pipelines transmitting oil, natural gas, water, fiberoptics, and electricity. The oil and natural gas would probably come from Azerbejan and Russia and arrive first in Samsun, Turkey, a port on the country’s Black Sea coast. From there, it would go to Ceyhan, a city near Turkey’s Mediterannean coast. It would then travel through an undersea pipeline to Ashkelon, a city in Israel, and then go over land to Eilat, an Israeli city on the Gulf of Aqaba, which feeds into the Red Sea. From there, it could go to India.

Israel is interested in this project as a secure route for it to recieve energy. India finds it an appealing method to recieve large quantities of oil and natural gas through a route that would avoid both the crowded and potentially dangerous Suez Canal and the Straits of Hormuz. Eventually, the Medstream project could also send oil and natural gas to countries throughout Asia.

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No fires in the Mideast?

June 20th, 2008 by Daniel Kaplow

It has been clear since the Hamas takeover in Gaza last summer that Israel’s military options there have not been sanguine. The conclusion of a cease-fire deal with Hamas further confirms Israel’s inability to threaten force as a credible deterrent to continued Hamas attacks. While Israel gained some concessions from the deal – Hamas dropping demands that Israel cease military operations in the West Bank and Hamas stopping rocket attacks – Israel stands to lose much more from the deal than it gains.

First, this cease-fire deal gives Hamas free reign to build terrorist networks and stockpile rockets in Gaza. And the ‘hudna’ or ‘tahdiyeh’ (period of quiet) to which Hamas has agreed is temporary be its nature; Hamas leaders have not given up their fundamental desire to destroy Israel. Second, Israel will not police the Rafah border crossing and instead will cede control to Egypt. Egypt has in the past shown it will not or cannot control its border with Gaza – one must recall earlier this year when 200,000 Palestinians broke through the border with the Egyptians throwing up their hands. Lack of control of this border crossing will facilitate the long-term strengthening of Hamas.

Third, this cease-fire restricts Israel’s ability to target other terrorist groups in Gaza that are not officially affiliated with Hamas. Fourth, the deal reduces Israel’s deterrence by encouraging Hamas and other groups, such as Hezbollah, to believe that they can use force to get Israel to meet their demands. Finally, this approach implicitly recognizes Hamas’ legitimacy, which undermines Palestinian moderates such as President Abbas. The only saving grace of this cease-fire is that Israel leaves open the option of using of force in the future having tried diplomacy first.

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Where will Kadima Go?

June 18th, 2008 by Daniel Kaplow

With unpopular Israeli Prime Minister Olmert again under investigation and the Kadima primary scheduled for the fall is it possible that his centrist Kadima party will survive the next Israeli election? The answer is a tentative yes – if savvy Kadima politicians can leverage the favorable political environment, expand their party’s infrastructure and contain Olmert’s unpopularity.

Kadima’s first strength is the discrediting of Israel’s political ideologies: The left could not bring peace; the right could not bring security. And yet, as compared to 10 years ago, Israelis are more willing to compromise on the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, Israelis overwhelmingly support separation from the Palestinians, continued Israeli military activity in the West Bank and Gaza and are as unhopeful as ever as to the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Kadima provides the centrist response: It is willing to negotiate core issues with the Palestinians and with the Syrians but is reluctant to trust them with Israel’s security. It expands settlements near the 1967 border and holds back on construction elsewhere. And Kadima politicians understand the need to make painful concessions in order to create a Palestinian state.

The unpopularity of the leaders of the liberal Labor party and the conservative Likud further strengthens Kadima. Labor chairman Barak is renowned for the failures and excesses of the 1990s peace process. Likud chairman Netanyahu is not fondly remembered for his concessions to the Palestinians and for his neo-liberal economic policies. And both suffered major corruption scandals.

Kadima’s second strength is the popularity of its politicians – except for Olmert. On that score, the public sees Foreign Minster and Deputy Prime Minister Tzipi Livni – a veteran of Israel’s intelligence apparatus – as competent and cool-headed. Livni, the front-runner to succeed Olmert as Kadima party chair, is popular though she is less than charismatic. And current Transportation Minster and Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz’s impressive resume includes serving as IDF Chief of Staff and Defense Minister making him a formidable contender.

Kadima’s centrist approach has managed to achieve a fragile sense of security. Yet the Second Lebanon War and the rocket fire from Gaza undermine this achievement. And Olmert’s latest corruption investigation only decreases his popularity.

Further, while Kadima is contending for the status as Israel’s majority party, its recent formation leads it to face enormous challenges retaining loyal supporters. And Olmert’s overwhelming unpopularity following the 2006 Lebanon war has made this a Herculean task.

As such, Kadima could follow the path of the first attempt to form a centrist party: the aptly-named Center party of the 1990s. While briefly popular, the party could not mediate the intensely polarized Israeli political atmosphere of the 1990s.

Certainly Kadima has already lost some of its initial luster. And if previous trends hold, Kadima will collapse in the next election. But most of the public’s ire is directed toward Olmert, not Kadima. And Kadima has a popular and pragmatic approach to Israel’s problems.

Kadima could thus follow an alternate path that would allow it to survive. To this end, Kadima would have to draw on its three major strengths: the public’s continuing disillusionment with the right and the left, the depth of its political bench and the unpopularity of likely opposition figures. Meanwhile, it would have to fight its image as corrupt and inept.

To do this, ambitious politicians like Livni and Mofaz could continue to use Olmert as a piñata to deflect public displeasure. They would also need to maintain their distance from him – or dump him if he begins to erode support for Kadima. Finally, they will need to enhance efforts to build a grassroots party infrastructure. And, if they succeed, Kadima might just become the majority, centrist party Israel has never had.

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