In a recent op-ed piece in the New York Times, P.W. Singer and Elina Noor argue against referring to al-Qaeda terrorists as jihadists. They explain that this term gives them cachet as holy warriors within the context of Islam, and defines us as opposed to Islam.
The article wouldn’t much matter except that jihadist is now on a long list of unwise terms to describe the members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups whom we oppose. The terms Islamic radicals or Islamic extremists or Wahabbis are inaccurate because our concern is not with their doctrines but their actions. Islamists refers even to those members of the Muslim Brotherhood whom are democratic and even somewhat moderate, and to the Saudi Arabian monarchy which supports our efforts against both al Qaeda and Iran. Islamofascists has been attacked for being not simply somewhat offensive, but inaccurate. Even the word terrorist is awkward because though it correctly identifies our most direct threat, it ignores the ideological reservoir behind those attacks. And none of these terms contain the ambiguity to understand a person who may have once openly fought against the American Army in Iraq but then joined a group like the Sons of Iraq or oppose violence entirely.
This entire discussion would be academic except there has been a pervasive inability and equally constant effort to try to define accurately a series of terms regarding the broader conflict that seriously erupted on September 11th. The name of the war has shifted from the War on Terror to the Global War on Terror to the Long War. Many people have critiqued one or another of these titles. One popular line of argument was that the War on Terror was excessively shallow; The Second World War, they said, was not called the War on Bombs and Tanks. But is the name World War Two so much deeper?
Why do so many people feel so strongly about names? This near-obsession suggests a general feeling of un-clarity regarding what this broader war is, with whom it is being fought and who we are.
Perhaps accuracy doesn’t matter as much we think. During World War Two, for example, we declared our enemy fascism though Japan was not. We called ourselves democrats though neither the United Kingdom nor the Soviet Union was. But while World War Two had deep ideological implications, it was primarily a military war. During the Cold War, a more similar situation, we blended together various threats under the term Communist. But as we later realized many who called themselves Communist were not necessarily our enemies. By the end of the war, we realized our opponents were less Communist than Soviet.
Though our understanding of the war and its nature changed dramatically over the course of the war, there were no debates over the name of the “Cold War.”
But this war appears to need such naming.
Since the start of this conflict many have attempted to think about it with various degrees of success. The most influential understanding was that of the neoconservatives, who argued that democracies were essentially more peaceful and stable than the autocracies that crowd the Middle East, and that we should promote popular governments actively, and with war if necessary. Though appealing, it failed to take into account the amount of damage that small groups of alienated individuals could wield with new forms of warfare. Wars once conducted by states and populations, are now atomized. It became an even more tenuous contention after a plurality of Palestinians voted for Hamas.
Another subtle though less influential was that of some pro-war liberals associated with Paul Berman and Dissent Magazine. They argued that our enemies were united by il-liberalism possibly rooted in European fascism and defeating it required the spread of individual liberty, the rights of women and homosexuals, and responsible government. Also appealing and as of yet not fully tested, this argument seems to ignore that currently, there is little local support for such movements.
Many others offered alternative explanations. Some claimed that the war was civilizational, between Christianity and Islam or Europeans and Arabs. Others have combined elements of these and other ideas.
Yet in the midst of these largely inconclusive ideological arguments, another group has done remarkable work in Iraq itself. Over the last two years, the situation in Iraq has distinctly improved. There are many reasons for this, but a significant one is the dramatic change in American military practice implemented largely due to the intellectual and practical efforts of a group associated with US Army General David Petraeus.
The innovation of Counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine has been to ignore ideology and civilizations and to focus directly on the individual. Imagine this: US soldiers are walking through the streets of Baghdad or Mosul or Basra and see a young man going towards them. From a distance they know little about him. He could be Sunni or Shiite, religious or secular, poor or wealthy, a feminist or a misogynist, gay or straight, friend or foe. For the moment, the soldiers don’t care. Their job, as understood by these thinkers, is to pressure him away from violently opposing the US Army and towards being a productive citizen.
They use sticks and carrots. Like modern urban police officers, the soldiers are visible presences so as to raise the price of opposition. The threat is clear – attack and you will be killed. At the same time, though, they try to encourage people not to attack. They fund construction projects both to improve the lives of the locals, and to give them jobs. They talk with and work for local leaders and politicians. They attempt to become part of the community. This is essentially similar to police officers backing after-school programs and attending town halls.
The striking element of this program is that it contains the ambiguity to understand a pedestrian as both a potential terrorist and a potential ally. Like Schroedinger’s cat, he is both terrorist and civilian at the same time.
On the surface the COIN community appears to be intellectual. Petraeus has a PhD from Princeton and consults professors at the Kennedy School of Government and sociologists. Group blogs which focus on counterinsurgency like Abu Muqawama boast grad students and experts in the field. They have advanced journals like Small Wars Journal and Armed Forces Journal which quote academic literature and it is not uncommon to find PhDs in the debate. Yet they are decidedly not intellectual. The difference is noticeable even in the books they cite. Paul Berman cites intellectual history and philosophy, Francis Fukuyama works off of Hegel. Those in the COIN community are solely interested in traditional, and largely military history.
Contrast this with another nationality’s COIN community. In an article published in Frieze magazine, it is reported that an Israeli war college teaches counterinsurgency practice using modern French philosophers Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. The concepts that the American soldiers implicitly operate from are described in wild, theoretical language. They describe the pedestrian mentioned above as being both a “becoming insurgent” and a “becoming civilian.” They say directly what the Americans stumble around, that a single person can simultaneously be a potential civilian and a potential insurgent. There is a marked difference between FM 3-24, the official Counterinsurgency Doctrine of the US Armed Forces, heavily influenced by General Petraeus, and the Israeli classes. FM 3-24 is written in riddles (“Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot”). The Israelis are referencing Foucault.
Yet this is not a criticism. The successes of the counterinsurgency community as implemented by generals like David Petraeus have been remarkable. There now appears to be a possibility of a functioning Iraqi state. This is little less than a miracle. There remain many challenges. The nascent Iraqi state must still navigate aggressive internal groups like that led by Moqtada al-Sadr, potential new opposition approved of by Ayatollah Sistani, international terrorist groups like al Qaeda, difficulties with the Turks over the Iraqi Kurdish community, and Iran. Colonel Gian Gentile of the US Army has furthermore argued that the effect of the counterinsurgency policies has been overstated, and the changing policies of those who joined the Sons of Iraq and Moqtada al-Sadr’s willingness to sign a cease-fire been understated. With respect to Colonel Gentile’s very valid argument, policies can ultimately be judged only by their effects.
This COIN theory has vast blind spots. It doesn’t explain how to present our arguments both for domestic consumption and for foreign persuasion. It doesn’t tell us whether we should intervene in Iran, negotiate, or sit back. It cannot envision an end to this torrential, broader war. But one cannot help but take pleasure from seeing a small space filled not with legalistic battles over names and wording but with subtle ideas and explicit action.
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